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This research examines, in experimental oligopoly markets, (a) whether
parallel pricing patterns emerge when communication among players is lim-
ited to cheap talk announcements; (b) whether such pricing patterns, if they
emerge, lead to payo¤s that exceed those players would receive in Nash
equilibrium of the one-shot game. Results indicate that announcements
and price matching lead to larger price-cost margins than in static Nash
equilibrium, while falling well short of joint pro…t maximization.
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21. Introduction
Economists’ concern with the possibility that …rm conduct might allow businesses
to collect economic pro…t over the long run goes back at least to Smith’s (1937,
p. 128) oft-quoted observation that
People of the same trade seldom meet together, even for merriment
and diversion, but the conversation ends in a conspiracy against the
public, or in some contrivance to raise prices.
Fromthat time forward, industrial economistshaveanalysedstructure–conduct–
performance relationships and o¤ered advice to policy makers on the kinds of rules
for business behaviour that are conducive to good market performance. Consis-
tent with this advice, competition policy for most market economies declines to
enforce collusive agreements and prohibits a variety of types of conduct thought
to facilitate collusive outcomes.1
Although the infusion of industrial economics by game theory has been marked
by great technical advances, this precision is of limited use for the purpose of ad-
vising policy-makers about rules for business behaviour. In the kind of imperfectly
competitive market that characterizes major industries in modern economies, the
best equilibrium market performance obtainable is that of the Nash equilibrium
of a nonrepeated game (henceforth, for conciseness, we will refer to this as the
static Nash equilibrium). Game theoretic models of markets as repeated games
are plagued by a multiplicity of equilibria, many of which yield …rms greater
pro…t than they would earn in static Nash equilibrium. Indeed, the Folk Theorem
states that in an in…nitely repeated game non-cooperative behaviour can sustain
any strategy yielding …rms individual payo¤s that exceed non-cooperative pay-
o¤s from the stage game, provided that the interest rate used to discount future
pro…ts is su¢ciently low.2 Theory alone cannot guide policy prescriptions.
The purpose of this study is to examine, in a laboratory situation, one type of
…rm conduct that is often alleged to worsen market performance. We consider a
kind of signalling that has been the subject of policy concern in both the European
Union and the United States: parallel pricing that emerges in an environment of
public announcements of prices and price changes (Phlips, 1995, Chapter 7). Such
behaviour has been attacked in the United States as a violation of the Sherman
Act Section 1 prohibition against contracts, combinations, and conspiracies in
1An older approach, which permitted collusion and sought to regulate its consequences, has
generally fallen into disfavor. See Martin (1997).
2Strategies yielding such payo¤s may also be an equilibrium in …nitely repeated games (Benoit
and Krishna, 1985; Harrington, 1987; Basu, 1992).
3restraint of trade,3 in the European Union as a violation of the Treaty of Rome
Article 85 prohibition of agreements and concerted practices that distort compe-
tition within the common market.4 In both jurisdictions, enforcement authorities’
early inferences of collusion from parallel conduct by enforcement authorities were
sustained by the courts, but later cases met the judicial objection that in imper-
fectly competitive markets outcomes that gave …rms collusive payo¤s might result
from conduct that was not collusive in a legal sense:5
concertation is not the only plausible explanation for parallel conduct.
To begin with, the system of price announcements may be regarded
as constituting a rational response to the fact that the pulp market
constituted a long term market and to the need felt by both buyers and
sellers to limit commercial risks. Further, the similarity in the dates of
the price announcements may be regarded as a direct result of the high
degree of market transparency, which does not have to be described as
arti…cial. Finally, the parallelism of prices and the price trends
may be satisfactorily explained by the oligopolistic tendencies
of the market and by the speci…c circumstances prevailing certain
periods. Accordingly, the parallel conduct established by the
Commission does not constitute evidence of concertation.
We seek to observe, in stylized experimental markets that capture the main
structural characteristics of important oligopoly markets,
² whether parallel pricing can emerge in a market that excludes explicit col-
lusion by design;
² whether such pricing patterns, if they emerge, lead to market performance
approaching that resulting from explicit collusion.
2. Conscious Parallelism and the Conscious Parallelism Game
Back-and-forth price announcements, sometimes implemented and sometimes not,
are a hallmark of many industries. The US steel industry is one example. The
3Leading cases are Interstate Circuit, Inc. et al. v. U.S., 306 U.S. 208 (1938); American
Tobacco Co. et al. v. U.S., 328 U.S. 781 (1946); Theater Enterprises, Inc. v. Paramount Film
Distr. Corp. et al., 346 U.S. 537 (1953).
4See among other references Dyestu¤s Commission Decision of 24 July 1969 JO L 195/11
[1969] CMLR D23 and Italian Flat Glass Commission Decision of 7 December 1988 OJ No
L33/44 4 April 1989.
5Re Wood Pulp Cartel: A. Ahlström oy and others versus E.C. Commission [1993] 4 CMLR
407 at 582-3; emphasis added. On the distinction between the legal and economic notions of
collusion, see Baker (1992) and Martin (1992).
4experiment described here, which permitssuch behaviour, ispatterned in a general
way after MacLeod’s (1985) formal model of consciously parallel price changes.6
The market is one in which each …rm sells a single variety of a di¤erentiated
product. The model is one of a repeated game, in which each period has two
stages. In the …rst stage, …rms play an announcement game, announcing prices or
price changes and reacting to the announcements of other …rms. The announce-
ment stage is followed by a second stage in which …rms set actual prices.
2.1. The announcement stage
Let P be the vector of announced prices. MacLeod imposes three axioms on
function rji(P;¢Pi) that gives the response by …rm j to a price change ¢Pi
announced by …rm i:
² rji is continuous and continuously di¤erentiable;
² rji is independent of scale changes: rji(®P;®¢Pi) = ®rji(P;¢Pi)
² response functions are symmetric, in the sense that relabelling …rms does
not alter responses.
MacLeod (1985, Proposition 3) shows that the unique response function sat-
isfying these axioms is a matching function,
rji(P;¢Pi) = ¢Pi; (2.1)
a result that implies behaviour of the kind observed in conscious parallelism cases.
He interprets this as a socially acceptable rule of thumb of the type that might be
expected to emerge if pro…t functions are not common knowledge (1985, p. 32).
This price matching strategy is then embedded in an equilibrium strategy for
the announcement game; this strategy speci…es
² a …rm will match an announced price increase if it is individually pro…table
to do so, assuming all other …rms match the increase, and if all other …rms
match the increase;
² a …rm will match an announced price decrease;
² defection triggers reversion to the Nash equilibrium prices of the one-shot
game.
6The discussion that follows is heuristic; for a comprehensive presentation, see MacLeod
(1985).
5Informational requirements are minimal: each …rm is able to observe the an-
nouncements of other …rms, knows the Nash reversion prices, and knows whether
or not the increase, if matched by all …rms would be pro…table for itself. It does
not know whether or not the increase would be pro…table for rivals.7
2.2. The price-setting stage
The announcement game is followed by a pricing game. The conscious parallelism
strategy requires …rms to set the equilibrium prices from the announcement game.
The strategy is sustained by the threat that if any …rm defects from announced
prices, all other …rms will revert to the noncooperative equilibrium prices of the
underlying stage game. The conscious parallelism equilibrium prices exceed these
static Nash prices by the same amount for all …rms (this is a consequence of
the matching rule (2.1)), and are such that further matched increases will be
unpro…table for at least one …rm.
3. The Experimental Market
MacLeod’s analytical framework is quite general. Experimental implementation
required us to select speci…c functional forms for demand and cost functions. We
discuss the duopoly version here.8
We assume linear demand curves,
p1 = a1 ¡b(q1 + µq2) (3.1)
p2 = a2 ¡b(µq1 + q2) (3.2)
where 0 < µ < 1. Varieties are thus demand substitutes, and …rms’ choice vari-
ables, prices, are strategic complements.
We assume that …xed costs are zero and that marginal costs c1 and c2, respec-
tively, are constant. Without loss of generality, let
a1 ¡ c1 · a2 ¡ c2: (3.3)
For simplicity and with some abuse of terminology we will refer to variety 2 as
the higher-quality variety (strictly speaking this would require a2 > a1).
7One can conceive of a dual quantity-matching strategy, in which …rms would announce and
react to announcements of output changes. For a discussion of quantity announcements in the
US automobile industry, see Doyle and Snyder (1996).
8Results generalize to the n-…rm case, as shown in an appendix available on request from
Stephen Martin.
63.1. Static Nash equilibrium prices
If demand for both varieties is nonnegative,9 the quantity demanded of variety 1
satis…es
b(1 ¡µ
2)q1 = (a1 ¡c1) ¡ µ(a2 ¡ c2) + µ(p2 ¡ c2) ¡ (p1 ¡ c1); (3.4)
with an analogous expression for variety 2. Firm 1’s pro…t then satis…es
b(1 ¡ µ
2)¼1 = (p1 ¡ c1)[(a1 ¡ c1) ¡ µ(a2 ¡ c2) + µ(p2 ¡ c2) ¡(p1 ¡c1)]: (3.5)
The …rst-order condition for maximizing ¼1 with respect to p1 gives the equa-
tion of …rm 1’s price reaction function,
2(p1 ¡ c1) = (a1 ¡ c1) ¡ µ(a2 ¡ c2) + µ(p2 ¡ c2): (3.6)
Solving the equations of the two reaction functions gives static Nash equilib-
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2 ¡c2) = (2 + µ ¡ µ
2)(a2 ¡ c2) ¡ µ(a1 ¡ c1): (3.8)
From these expressions it follows that the higher-quality variety has the greater
static Nash equilibrium price-cost margin,
p
N
2 ¡ c2 ¸ p
N
1 ¡ c1: (3.9)
The equations of the reaction functions imply that the quantity demanded of
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and in static Nash equilibrium the higher-quality variety has the greater payo¤.
9In the n-…rm case, if one …rm prices so high that its sales are zero, the market becomes an
(n ¡ 1)-…rm oligopoly among the remaining …rms. Programming for the experiments included
subroutines to deal with such events.
73.2. Conscious parallelism equilibrium prices
We now turn to a question that is critical for the conscious parallelism strategy of
the MacLeod model, in which prices are raised until at least one …rm is unwilling
to go along with additional increases. How high will price rise if …rms behave in
this way?
From (3.4), if all prices are increased by ¢p from the noncooperative equilib-
rium level, the quantity demanded of variety 1 falls according to
q1(p
N
1 + ¢p ¡ c1;p
N


































1 ¡ c1): (3.14)
There is a similar expression for …rm 2. These expressions give the price in-
crease that …rm i would prefer, assuming that the other …rm matches the increase.
By (3.9), it is the lowest quality variety that will have the smallest Nash equi-
librium price-cost margin. The conscious parallelism strategy therefore implies
that it will be the producer of the lowest-quality variety that calls a halt to price
increases.
3.3. Joint pro…t maximization
It is straightforward to show (and a standard result in this type of model) that
joint pro…t maximisation requires each …rm to set the price that it would set if it
were a monopolist not faced with the competition of substitute varieties:
p
J





The conscious parallelism equilibrium is illustrated graphically in Figure 3.4. The
non-cooperative equilibrium (point N) is to be found in the intersection of the












































Figure 3.1: The Conscious Parallelism Equilibrium
N as the origin. It shows all possible conscious parallelism prices. The conscious
parallelism prices preferred by …rm 1 and …rm 2 are found where isopro…t curves
are tangent to the CP line: …rm 1 prefers prices corresponding to CP¤, while
…rm 2 could still gain from a further price increase to CP0 – given that this price
would be matched by …rm 1. Since …rm 1 is worse o¤ at point CP0, it does not
match this price increase and CP¤ is the conscious parallelism equilibrium.
4. Experimental Design
4.1. Treatments
Four treatments make up the overall experiment:
I. A control treatment in which players act as independent price-setters.
9In each period, each player selects a price; each player is informed of
the prices chosen by the other players, of its own quantity sold and its
own payo¤; the experiment then proceeds to the next period. Subjects
from this experiment do not participate in later experiments.
II. A treatment to examine whether consciously parallel behaviour emerges
spontaneously from oligopoly interactions.
Each period consists of two stages. In the …rst stage, players may an-
nounce prices. Any announcements are communicated to other players
via the computer network. Firms may make multiple announcements,
retract announced changes and so on. When no announcement has
been made for a speci…ed interval (initially two minutes, reduced to
30 seconds after subjects have acquired experience with the mechanics
of the procedure), the period moves to the second stage, in which …rms
select actual prices. Prices, own sales, and own payo¤s are commu-
nicated as in the …rst session. The session then proceeds to the next
period. Subjects from this experiment will not participate in later
experiments.
III. A treatment to examine the implications of consciously parallel behaviour
for market performance.
As in treatment II, each period will consist of an announcement game
and a pricing game. In the announcement game, players are con-
strained to match or to not match announced price changes. In other
words, they are obliged to follow the MacLeod conscious parallelism
strategy. The price-setting stage of the game is identical to that of
treatment II.
IV. A treatment to examine the impact of socialisation on the sustainability of
consciously parallel behaviour.
Subjects from treatment III participate in a follow-up session of treat-
ment II. The hypothesis to be tested is that subjects who have had
experience with price matching strategies in treatment III will tend
to follow such strategies even when the experimental design does not
force them to do so.
Treatment I is a posted-o¤er market with simulated demand. Treatment II
is similar to the announcement games examined by Holt and Davis (1990) and
10Price-cost margins Single-period payo¤s
L H L H
Static Nash 3.3125 4.4375 25.60 45.95
CP 13.250 14.375 58.52 101.22
J¦M 15.000 16.000 55.00 106.67
Table 4.1: Comparative Stage-Game Equilibrium Values
Cason (1995), although we use a di¤erent market structure. Grether and Plott
(1984) impose speci…c market practices (in their case, advance notice of price
changes and most-favoured nation clauses) on experimental markets, as we do
in Treatment III, and examine the consequences for market performance. Our
focus on experience in comparing Treatments III and IV is related to Benson and
Faminow (1988), which uses a spatial di¤erentiation model.
4.2. Parameter values/market characteristics
Each session involved 4 experimental subjects. Demand intercepts and marginal
cost parameters were chosen so that
aH ¡ cH = 32 (4.1)
for two players and
aL ¡ cL = 30 (4.2)
for the other two players. Each player knew its own demand intercept and unit
cost, and did not know those of the other players.
The product di¤erentiation parameter µ was set equal to 2/3. This introduces
enough di¤erentiation to avoid substantial shifts in sales in response to small price
changes, but means that di¤erent varieties are close enough substitutes so that
there are substantial potential gains from coordinating behaviour.
As might be suspected from the discussion of duopoly (and as is shown in
the Appendix for the general case), it is only the di¤erences a ¡ c that matter
for incentives and payo¤s. Adding/subtracting the same constant to/from all
values of a and c in a session leaves the underlying game unchanged, although it
does change equilibrium price levels. This aspect of the experimental market was
used to vary the equilibrium price levels of di¤erent sessions while maintaining
comparability of marginsacross sessions. Subjects could therefore honestly be told
that any information they might have received about price levels from subjects of
previous sessions was not relevant for their session.
Table 4.1 compares price-cost margins and single-period payo¤s in three al-



















Table 4.2: Aarhus conscious parallelism experiments: descriptive statistics
margins and payo¤s are very close to the joint-pro…t-maximizing values, and that
both are substantially greater than the corresponding static Nash values. The
potential reward to successful coordination is large.
Equilibrium payo¤s for the H subjects are substantially greater than those
for the L subjects. Di¤erential exchange rates were used to convert the experi-
mental currency unit (ECU) to Danish kroner (3 ECU/kroner for L subjects, 6
ECU/kroner for H subjects), so that potential cash payments to H and L subjects
were essentially the same. These values were chosen so that experimental currency
unit (ECU)-Danish kroner exchange rates could be used that would make mental
conversions by subjects during the course of the session straightforward, while
leading to payo¤s within our budget constraint.
Subjects received a 60 kroner show-up fee as well as the kroner-equivalent
of their experimental pro…ts. The …rst period was a practice session that did
not count toward the subject’s payo¤. Actual payments ranged from 180 to 540
Danish kroner (approximately $30 to $90) (before allowing for Danish income
tax). Sessions lasted between 1.5 and 2 hours.
124.3. Organizational considerations
The experiments were carried out at the University of Aarhus. Subjects were
mainly although not exclusively undergraduate economics majors.10
Each session lasted a minimum of 20 periods. We used a random stopping rule
to determine the end of the session. At the end of period 20 and of each following
period, a die was rolled in plain view of the experimental subjects. If the die
came up 6, the experiment ended, otherwise it continued. The resulting ending
probability makesthe consciousparallelismstrategy anoncooperative equilibrium.
The number sessions of each treatment, and the number of rounds in each
session, are reported in Table (4.2).11
Experimental subjects were linked via a computer network. The programming
language is Turbo-Pascal; we used the RatImage routines developed by Abbink
and Sadrieh (1995), which were designed for computer-aided human behaviour
experiments.
Instructions (reproduced in an appendix at the end of this paper) were scrolled
across the computer screen. Options available through the menu included a cal-
culator and a history option that allowed a player to review previous prices of all
…rms as well as its own previous sales and pro…ts. This is illustrated in Figure
4.1, which shows a sample screen from treatment I.12 In the event, experimental
subjects consulted the price history for 1130 of the 1500 observations generated
by the Aarhus sessions.
In treatment I, which involves price setting but no announcements, subjects
saw a screen of the kind shown in Figure 4.2 at the end of each period. This shows
all four prices, as well as own quantity sold, own pro…t, and accumulated pro…t.
Figure 4.3 shows …rm 1’s screen appearance in treatment II, after …rm 2 has
announced a price change and other …rms have had the opportunity to react to
this announcement.
Figure 4.3 may be compared with Figures 4.4 and 4.5. These show …rm 1’s
screen in treatment III when a price change is announced (Figure 4.4) and after
players have been able to react to the announced change (Figure 4.5). The infor-
mation that is given to …rm 1 in Figure 4.4 is consistent with that required by
MacLeod’s formal model: under the conscious parallelism strategy, …rms are to
match announced price increases if it is pro…table for them to do so and all other
…rms match the announced increase. Somewhat more broadly, we intended to
give subjects information that would replicate the kind of information real-world
10The subject who earned the largest payo¤ was majoring in Japanese.
11Session 4 of experiment 2 and session 3 of experiment 3 were terminated due to software
problems.
12Additional screens from the various treatments are posted on the world wide web at url
http://www.ibt.dk/www/samf/oko/cie/screens.htm.
13Figure 4.1: Price History Screen Image, Treatment I (price setting only)
Figure 4.2: Results Screen, Treatment I (price setting only)
14Figure 4.3: Treatment II, screen after an announcement is made
…rms might be expected to have if direct communication among competitors is
ruled out. This includes own cost and own and rivals’ prices, as well as what
realistically would be estimates of expected own sales and own pro…t.
5. Results
Table 5.1 gives a general description of the 16 sessions. Table 5.2 reports the
average di¤erence, subject by subject and session by session, between actual and
static Nash price-cost margins. Negative values indicate that the subject set
below-Nash prices, on average. The conscious parallelism values would be 9.9375
for L and H subjects; the joint-pro…t maximizing values would be 11.6875 and
11.5625, for L and H subjects respectively.
5.1. Treatment I
Figure 5.1 shows the development of price-cost margins in the 5 sessions of treat-
ment I (price-setting without announcements). What is shown in Figure 5.1 are
the arithmetic di¤erences between the actual and the static Nash price-cost mar-
gins, averaged over the 4 subjects in the session (two with low-quality, two with
high-quality varieties).
In sessions I–1, I–2, and I–3 margins are below static-Nash levels early in the
session. Margins in session I–1 rise steadily throughout the session. Margins
15Figure 4.4: Treatment III, price change announced
Figure 4.5: Treatment III, after all players have responded to an announced price
change
16Session Comments ¦=¦N(%)
I-1 3 …rms progressively move to above-static Nash prices;
…rm 2 a maverick
83
I-2 all …rms above Nash price in second half of the session 96
I-3 1 and 4 prices above Nash in middle periods; 2 and 3
Nash from period 7 on; endgame e¤ects
90
I-4 3 Nash from period 5 on; other players persistently above
Nash prices
135
I-5 above Nash throughout; apparent tacit collusion breaks
down periods 16–22, then resumes 23–25
141
II-1 prices essentially always above Nash level; 2 and 3 usually
near best response prices, 1 and 4 above best response
prices
130
II-2 1 and 4 persistently price above Nash, 3 slightly below
Nash, 2 mostly above but with two episodes of low prices
101
II-3 1 and 4 persistently price above Nash, 2 and 3 price at
Nash level throughout
104
II-5 signalling by 4, periods 11–17, all prices then above Nash;
otherwise, prices at Nash level
124
II-6 prices at or above Nash levels, periods 8–14; player 2
never above Nash level; slow decline from period 15
107
III-1 prices rise sharply through period 6, decline slowly there-
after, above Nash levels throughout
151
III-2 prices ‡uctuate above Nash level …rst 10 periods, then
rise sharply
121
III-4 prices above Nash throughout, substantially so periods
7–14, decline thereafter
145
IV-1 prices rise continuously through period 18, fall to Nash
levels period 20, begin to rise again
181
IV-2 prices ‡uctuate substantially around an average above
Nash levels
142
IV-3 prices rise through period 10, decline thereafter, end
around Nash level
111
Table 5.1: Aarhus conscious parallelism experiments: qualitative descriptions
17Session L1 L2 H1 H2
1-1 -0.01 -1.52 -0.76 0.06
1-2 -0.32 -0.06 0.80 1.20
1-3 0.40 -0.34 -0.74 1.37
1-4 2.47 3.09 1.05 3.04
1-5 2.99 3.40 2.28 3.57
2-1 2.64 1.79 2.00 2.82
2-2 0.26 0.25 -0.13 0.24
2-3 0.44 -0.13 -0.13 1.07
2-5 1.49 2.00 2.15 3.73
2-6 0.49 -0.15 0.59 1.22
3-1 3.13 2.65 3.19 3.15
3-2 1.47 1.80 1.14 1.75
3-4 3.48 2.47 3.72 3.38
4-1 6.31 4.98 6.01 7.14
4-2 1.20 1.73 1.06 2.29
4-3 0.97 1.72 0.97 0.43
Table 5.2: Aarhus conscious parallelism experiments: average (p¡ c) ¡(p ¡c)N,
by subject and session
Notes: For treatments I, II, and II, L1 is player 1, L2 is player 2, H1 is player 3,
H4 is player 4; for experiment IV, L1 is player 3, L2 is player 4; H1 is player 1,
H2 is player 4; periods 16 and 17 omitted from sample for player 4, experiment














Figure 5.1: Treatment I, sessions 1–5, average (p ¡ c)¡ static Nash (p ¡ c), by
session
in session I–2 fall quite low though period 5, rise sharply through period 12,
then decline slightly thereafter. Margins in session I–3 rise above static-Nash
levels through period 8, level o¤ for about 9 periods, then decline. The latter
may appears to be endgame e¤ects, which were evident in many of the sessions.
Despite the continuation probability implied by the random stopping time, the
…rst period in which the experiment might stop (period 20) seemed to be a focal
point around which behaviour became more rivalrous.
5.1.1. History matters
One aspect of the MacLeod conscious parallelism model is that the static Nash
equilibrium is known at the start of the game (1985, p. 34). With this in mind,
the instructions included a set of “period 0” prices that were in fact the static
Nash equilibrium prices. They were not described as such to the experimental
subjects, who were told without editorial comment that the period 0 prices were
based on previous experimental experience.
In treatment I, session 4, the period 0 prices were the joint-pro…t maximizing
prices (without identifying them as such). In treatment I, session 5, no period 0
prices were given. It is evident from Table 5.2 that price-cost margins in sessions 4













Figure 5.2: Average (p¡ c)¡ static Nash (p ¡ c), Treatment II, by session
5.1 indicates that payo¤s in these sessions were similarly higher than the other
sessions of treatment I. In session 4, price-cost margins average 3.5 ECU above
Nash levels in period 2 and declined slowly through 34 sessions to an average 1.1
ECU above the Nash level.
In treatment I, session 5 margins never fall below static Nash levels. There
seem to be two relative breakdowns in coordination, once in period 12 and once
over periods 19 through 23. The latter appears to be an endgame e¤ect. When
the game continues through several rolls of the die, prices rise again.
5.2. Treatment II
Treatment II allows players to communicate via cheap-talk announcements. Av-
erage excess price-cost margins for Treatment II are shown in Figure 5.2.13
Sessions 2, 3, and 6 ‡uctuate around and converge to roughly the static Nash
level. Results for these sessions are consistent with those for related speci…cations
that have been reported in the literature (for example, Holt and Davis, 1990).
Sessions II-1 and II-5 exhibit di¤erent types of behaviour. Average margins
in session II-1 decline over the initial periods, but stay consistently above static
Nash levels. The same is true for average margins in session II-5, which exhibit













Figure 5.3: Treatment II, session 5, (p ¡ c)¡ static Nash (p ¡ c); periods 16 and
17 omitted.
greater ‡uctuation. The e¤ect of price announcements for these two sessions recall
the results reported by Brown-Kruse, Cronshaw, and Schenk (1993) for location
communications.
Treatment II, session 5 merits separate attention. Its time path of price-cost
margins is shown in Figure 5.3.
It will be noted that player 4 set very high prices in periods 11, 12, and 15. In
periods 16 and 17, which are omitted from Figure 5.3 for reasons of scale, player
4 set a price of 400. An interview after the session established that these high
prices were an attempt to signal to other players and lead them to raise prices.
This e¤ort was abandoned in and after period 18, but the net result was relatively
high margins and payo¤s for the session as a whole.
5.3. Treatment III
In treatment III, players were able to make announcements, but they were obliged
tofollow theprice-matching elementoftheconsciousparallelismstrategy. Margins











Figure 5.4: Treatment III, session 1, (p ¡c)¡ static Nash (p¡ c)
sessions di¤ered, however.
In treatment III, session 1, price-cost margins rose for the …rst 6 periods, then
fell slowly for the rest of the session (Figure 5.4). There is only 1 instance in
which one player set a price below the Nash level, and this occurred in period
20. One might interpret this as an early comprehension of the private bene…ts
of refraining from vigorous competition, more or less sustained by the conscious
parallelism announcement mechanism.
The sharp price increase in the session occurs in period 4, with further smaller
increases in periods 5 and 6. These periods are marked by many announcements
(10 in periods 4and 5, 14 in period 6), mostly of small positive ornegative changes.
In period 4, 5 of the 10 announced changes were matched by all players (Table
5.3). All of these 5 announcements were increases. 2 of the announcements in
period 5 and 2 of the announcements in period 6 (all increases) were matched by
all players.
In treatment III, session 2, on the other hand, price-cost margins ‡uctuated
around Nash levels for more than half of the session (Figure 5.5). In period 13,
however, margins rose sharply, and they remained at this higher level forthe rest of
22Period 3 prices 16.00 16.90 16.80 16.00
3 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50
3 0.00 -0.30 -0.30 -0.30
4 0.00 -0.50 0.00 -0.50
2 0.10 0.10 0.00 0.10
3 0.00 -0.30 -0.30 -0.30
4 0.00 -0.30 -0.30 -0.30
3 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20
4 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50
1 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
1 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Period 4 prices 17.90 19.00 18.80 17.50
Table 5.3: Session III-1, period 4: price change announcements












Figure 5.5: Treatment III, session 2, (p ¡c)¡ static Nash (p¡ c)
23Period 12 prices 13.50 16.50 15.44 13.50
1 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00
1 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00
1 2.00 2.00 2.00 0.00
1 2.00 2.00 0.00 2.00
Period 13 prices 17.00 20.00 17.44 19.000
Table 5.4: Session III-2, period 13: price change announcements
Note: First column identi…es the player announcing a price change.
Period 6 prices 18.25 18.50 16.89 15.90
3 0.00 0.00 2.00 0.00
1 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
1 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
1 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
3 0.00 0.55 0.55 0.55
2 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Period 7 prices 22.00 20.00 20.95 18.50
Table 5.5: Session III-4, period 7: price change announcements
Note: First column identi…es the player announcing a price change.
the session. In the announcement segment of period 13, player 1 announced a price
increase of 2 ECU 4 times in a row (Table 5.4). The …rst two times, all three of
the other players matched the increase. The …nal two times, two of the other three
players matched the increase. Actual prices that were set were somewhat below
the announced levels, but substantially above the levels of previous periods.14
The path of price-cost margins in treatment III, session 4 (Figure 5.6) resem-
bles that of treatment III, session 1 in some ways. Prices start at and rise to a
higher level in session 4 than in session 1. In session 4, the peak of prices comes
in the middle of the session, not the beginning. In session 4, the sharp increase
in prices occurs in period 7.
6 price change announcements were made in the announcement segment of pe-
riod 7 (Table 5.5). First player 3 announced an increase of 2 ECU; no other player
matched this increase. Player 1 then successively announced 3 price increases of 1
ECU each. Each time, all three other players matched the announcement. Player
3 then announced an increase of .55 ECU, which was matched by players 2 and 4
14That posted prices fell short of announced levels is generally characteristic of the announce-
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Figure 5.7: Average (p¡ c)¡ static Nash (p¡ c), Treatment IV, by session
but not by player 1. Then player 2 announced an increase of 1 ECU, which was
matched by all other players.
5.4. Treatment IV
Treatment IV is identical in structure to treatment II: players may make and react
to cheap-talk price change announcements in the …rst half of each period. They
are not constrained to follow the conscious parallelism announcement strategy.
All subjects in treatment IV had experience with treatment III.
The di¤ering character of the three sessions is evident in Figure 5.7. The
combination of experience and the possibility of making announcements yields
very high margins in session IV-1 and comparatively high margins in session IV-
2, but does not sustain margins above the static Nash level in session IV-3.15
Prices in treatment IV, session 1 rise steadily through period 14, level o¤ for
another 4 periods, and then fall in periods 19 and 20. This last may be interpreted
as an endgame e¤ect. Throughout this session, price-cost margins tended to move
together.
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Figure 5.8: Average (p¡c)¡ static Nash (p¡c), period by period, treatments III
and IV, periods 1-20
In most of periods 1 through 14, many announcements were made. The general
pattern was that announced prices were greater than prices that were actually set;
Cason (1995) reports similar behaviour. However, the trend in both announced
and posted prices was upward through period 14.
The time-path of price-cost margins in treatment IV, session 2 is much more
level. Prices rise through period 4, decline slowly and with much ‡uctuation for
about 10 periods, then rise somewhat.
In treatment IV, session 3, margins rise by period 3, ‡uctuate above Nash
levels for 11 periods, then decline toward the end of the session.
5.5. Comparison of Treatments III and IV
It is instructive to compare treatments III and IV. Figure 5.8 shows the average
price-cost margin, minus the static Nash margin, for the …rst 20 periods of all
treatment III sessions and all treatment IV sessions. Each average is therefore
taken over 12 experimental subjects, half with low-quality varieties and half with
high-quality varieties. An average of zero means subjects are pricing at the static
27Nash level. The average of the conscious parallelism margins is 13.8125, of the
joint-pro…t maximizing margins 15.5 (Table 4.1).
Subjectspriceabovestatic Nash levelsforboth treatmentsIII and IV, although
they approach neither the conscious parallelism nor the joint-pro…t maximizing
level.16 Margins are greater for treatment IV than for treatment III from period
9 through 18, at which point what should probably be interpreted as endgame
e¤ects kick in.
5.6. Statistical Analysis
Table 5.6 reports the results of a regression analysis using the complete 1500-
element sample. The dependent variable is the deviation between observed and
static Nash price-cost margins. The …rst 20 observations in this sample are for
treatment 1, session 1, subject 1; these are followed by 20 observations for treat-
ment 1, session 1, subject 2; and so on. The …nal 26 observations in the sample
are for treatment IV, session 3, player 4.
In Table 5.6, the coe¢cient of C is the constant term in the regression. F
is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 for the …rst period in each session.
This controls for the fact the subjects were told that they would not be paid
for this period. H is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 for observations
generated by subjects with high-quality varieties, and 0 otherwise. In static Nash
equilibrium, high-quality varieties should exhibit larger margins. In conscious
parallelism equilibrium, the excess of the margin over the static Nash level is the
same for varieties of both types. The excess of the joint-pro…t maximizing margin
over the static Nash level is slightly greater for low-quality varieties than for high-
quality varieties. In any event, neither F nor H have signi…cant coe¢cients for
any of the speci…cations reported in Table 5.6.
D24 is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 for treatments 2 and 4, which
have the same structure, and 0 otherwise. Similarly, D3 and D4 are dummy
variables keyed on treatments 3 and 4 respectively.
The residual category is therefore treatment 1. The coe¢cient of D24 should
indicate the impact on margins of allowing subjects to make announcements,
relative to the price-setting only treatment. The coe¢cient of D3 should indicate
the di¤erential e¤ect of constraining subjects to follow the conscious parallelism
strategy, and the coe¢cient of D4 should indicate the impact of experience with
the conscious parallelism strategy on margins, over and above any e¤ect of the
ability to make announcements pure and simple.
D400 is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 for the two observations
from treatment 2, session 5 in which subject 4 set a price of 400. Inclusion of this
16In this respect, our results are similar to those of Grether and Plott (1984).
28(1) (2) (3)
C 1.1253 1.1343 -0.0907
( 4.5846) ( 4.6315) (0.3742)
D400 386.2814 378.2000 378.2000
(1709.099) (275.5513) ( 275.3662)
F -0.4572 -0.3971 -0.3253
(1.3752) (1.1960) (1.0421)
H 0.2852 0.2624 0.2623
(1.1446) (1.0694) (1.1653)
D24 -0.1294 -0.3156 0.9062
(0.4762) (1.2319) (3.3491)
D3 1.3891 1.3887 2.6103
( 4.4520) (4.4431) ( 8.0897)
D4 1.7080 1.8938 1.8937













R2 0.9757 0.9771 0.9796
Table 5.6: Regression Results
Dependent variable: (p¡c)¡ static Nash (p¡c); t-statistics in parentheses (based
on Newey-West heteroskedasticity-consistent variance estimates).
29Price-cost margins Single-period payo¤s
L H L H
Static Nash 3.3125 4.4375 25.60 45.95
Announcements
+ experience
6.0217 7.4090 38.86 59.07
CP 13.250 14.375 58.52 101.22
Table 5.7: Margins and One-shot payo¤s implied by Table 5.6, column 3 speci…-
cation
dummy variable does not a¤ect the other coe¢cient estimates; it is responsible
for the high R2-square statistics in Table 5.6.
Column 1 of Table 5.6 distinguishes the impact of the di¤erent treatments on
price-cost margins (relative to static Nash levels). The coe¢cient of D24 is not
statistically signi…cant — announcements as such do not generate increments in
margins compared with treatment I — while D3 and D4 both have coe¢cients
that are signi…cant and large, relative to the static Nash margins given in Table
4.1.
Column 2 in addition examines the impact of the signalling episode in treat-
ment I, session 5. The variables S251, S252, S253, and S254 are dummy variables
for each subject in this session that take the value 1 for periods in which player 4
appeared to follow a signalling strategy, and 0 otherwise. All 4 of these signalling
variables have signi…cant positive coe¢cients.
Column 3 of Table 5.6 includes two additional dummy variables, one for treat-
ment 1, session 4 and one for treatment 1, session 5. As noted above, session I-4
gave subjects the joint-pro…t maximizing prices as period 0 prices, while session
I-5 gave no period 0 prices. Both variables have signi…cant positive coe¢cients.17
In addition, when these variables that control for di¤erences in initial conditions
are included as explanatory variables, the coe¢cient of D24 becomes positive and
statistically signi…cant: controlling for other factors constant, the ability to make
announcements along has a moderate positive e¤ect on price-cost margins.
The implications of the regression analysis for price-cost margins and payo¤s
are summarized in Table 5.7.18 In the experimental markets that we have ex-
amined, the possibility of making announcements increases margins, as does the
use of the conscious parallelism mechanism and experience with announcements.
17These results may be contrasted with those of Mason, Phillips, and Redington (1991), who
test for and reject the hypotheses that experience with practice periods anchored behavior in the
session proper. Their treatments involved linear demand, two quantity-setting subjects (with
constant but di¤erent unit costs), and a homogeneous good.
18The payo¤ estimates in Table 5.7 are from a separate regression, with dependent variable
actual minus static Nash payo¤ and explanatory variables as in Table 5.6, column 3.
30Margins nearly double, and payo¤s increase 30% (H varieties) and 50% (L vari-
eties), compared with static Nash levels. While these are substantial increases,
they remain below conscious parallelism and joint-pro…t-maximizing levels. Col-
umn 3 also indicates that either signalling or a history of high prices will sustain
margins above those indicated in Table 5.7.
6. Summary
We have described imperfectly competitive experimental markets designed to ex-
plore the impact of price announcements and consciously parallel behaviour on
market performance.
We have observed behavior under a single set of market conditions. As is
traditional in experimental economics, focusing the design on research hypothe-
ses has been assisted by the simplicities of linear demand and constant marginal
costs. Also in accord with common practice, private information about demand
intercepts and costs limited individual subjects to a proper subset of the mini-
mal information for an explicit calculation of conscious parallelism or joint-pro…t-
maximizing outcomes. All markets studied had each of four sellers produce a
single variety of the commodity.19 Perhaps the most important open question is
the robustness of the results reported here to the degree of product di¤erentiation
(µ); this is the subject of ongoing research.
Conditional on these elements of the speci…cation, the ability to make an-
nouncements is here su¢cient to sustain price-cost margins that are above static
Nash levels. Margins are higher still if subjects are constrained to match or not
match announced price changes, although for such treatments margins do not
reach levels of the conscious parallelism equilibrium. In such treatments, periods
of sharp price increases are also periods of substantial price-matching behaviour.
Experience with the matching strategy also leads to greater margins, as does
attempts to assume a price leadership role and a history of higher prices.
The results reported here suggest that imperfectly competitive markets often
can yield prices above and e¢ciencies below the static Nash equilibrium standard.
The kinds of signalling mechanisms that appear in treatments II, III, and IV of
this experiment are available in real-world markets, are not condemned by main-
stream competition policies, and support returns above static Nash equilibrium
levels.
19Most of the simpli…cations just listed are standard; empirical evidence of the robustness
of observations with respect to these simpli…cations is rare. Holt (1995) indicates that 4-seller




Today we are going to set up an experimental market.
The market is supplied by four …rms.
Each of you will take the part of one …rm.
The pro…t or loss your …rm makes in the market depends on the decisions you
make and on the decisions made by the other …rms, in a way that is explained
below.
The pro…t or loss your …rm makes in the market determines the amount you will
be paid IN CASH at the end of the experiment.
The experiment will last at least 20 periods. The precise ending time of the
experiment will be determined randomly.
You are …rm number == i ==.
You do not know the …rm numbers of the other participants in the experiment,
and they do not know your …rm number.
DESCRIPTION OF THE MARKET
Each …rm produces a product that is sold in competition with the products of
other …rms.
The amount your …rm sells and the pro…t you make in each period depends on
the price you set and the prices other …rms set in that period.
Each unit of output that you sell costs you c to produce. You do not know the
cost per unit of the other …rms in the experiment and they do not know your cost
per unit.
If your price is greater than your production cost, you will earn a pro…t on every
unit of output that you sell.
If your price is less than your production cost, you will lose money on every unit
of output that you sell.
The buyers in the market may consider products to be somewhat di¤erent. As a
consequence of possible di¤erences in demand and cost, di¤erences in price may
arise.
INFORMATION YOU WILL BE GIVEN
32Before the …rst period starts you will be given information from previous experi-
mental experience in this market. You will get to know prices of all …rms and the
sales and the pro…t you would make if these prices were charged.
In every period, after all participants have entered a price for their …rm you will
be shown the prices of all …rms and the sales and the pro…t you made in that
period. You will also be given information about your accumulated pro…ts.
You will able to recall data from former periods (prices of all …rms, sales and
pro…t you made) by using the ‘Price History’ option.
PRESS ESCAPE TO LEAVE THE INSTRUCTIONS
7.2. Experiment II
GENERAL DESCRIPTION
in addition to the instructions of Experiment I:
In every period there is an announcement phase and a price setting phase. These
two phases are explained below.
DESCRIPTION OF THE MARKET
as in Experiment I.
DESCRIPTION OF THE ANNOUNCEMENT PHASE
AND THE PRICE SETTING PHASE
During the announcement phase, …rms indicate the prices they may charge. Af-
terwards, in the price setting phase, each …rm will set the price that it will actually
charge, and may choose a di¤erent price, higher or lower, than any price it an-
nounced.
Each …rm may make as many announcements as it likes to make.
If no …rm announces a price for two minutes, the announcement phase will be
closed. Later in the experiment after you and the other participants have had
some experience with the way the process works, the time period will be shortened
to one minute and then to 30 seconds.
The experiment will then move to the price setting phase, in which you decide
the price you will actually charge in that period.
INFORMATION YOU WILL BE GIVEN
in addition to the instructions of Experiment II:
Each …rm will learn the announced prices of all …rms. You will also be told how
much sales and pro…ts you would make if the announced prices were actually
…nalized.
PRESS ESCAPE TO LEAVE THE INSTRUCTIONS
337.3. Experiment III
GENERAL DESCRIPTION
as in Experiment II.
DESCRIPTION OF THE MARKET
as in Experiments I and II.
DESCRIPTION OF THE ANNOUNCEMENT PHASE
AND THE PRICE SETTING PHASE
During the announcement phase, …rms indicate price changes they may make.
Afterwards, in the price setting phase each …rm will set the price that it will
actually charge, and may choose a di¤erent price, higher or lower, than the price
resulting from announced price changes.
Note that the announcementsare price CHANGES, i.e. …rmsannounce toincrease
or to decrease their price by a certain amount. In the price setting phase the
ABSOLUTE prices which are charged in the market have to be set.
Each …rm may announce as many price changes as it wishes to make. When one
…rm announces a price change, you will given the opportunity to announce and
identical price change.
If no …rm announces a price change for two minutes, the announcement phase will
be closed. Later in the experiment, after you and the other participants have had
some experience in the way the process works, this time period will be shortened
to one minute and then to 30 seconds.
The experiment will then move to the price setting phase, in which you enter the
price you will actually charge in that period.
INFORMATION YOU WILL BE GIVEN
as in Experiment II, with one change:
Each …rm will learn the announced price changes of all …rms.
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